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Cloud Foundation, Inc., v. Salazar, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2013 WL 6083927, 2013 U.S. Dist. 




I.  ABSTRACT 
 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that the BLM and 
Forest Service did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when they maintained and extended a 
boundary fence and decided not to expand a wild horse and burro range.  The court also held the 
BLM used reasoned decision making when it determined a target horse and burro population in a 
herd management plan.  Additionally, a National Environmental Policy Act claim was defeated 
under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine.1 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
 In Cloud Foundation,
2
 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
granted the government’s cross-motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs’ challenge 
to federal management of wild horses in southern Montana and northern Wyoming.3 The 
plaintiffs, two environmental groups (collectively “Cloud”), challenged action by the Bureau of 
Land Management (“BLM”) and the U.S. Forest Service (“USFS”) (collectively “Government”) 
under the Wild Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act (“Wild Horses Act”) and the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).4  Because neither act creates a private right of action, the 
court reviewed Government compliance with the Wild Horses Act under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”).5 
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 The district court addressed two issues raised by the Government and three issues raised 
by Cloud.  The Government stated the issues as:  (1) whether Cloud challenged final agency 
action in their Wild Horse Act claims; and (2) whether Cloud exhausted their administrative 
remedies.6  Cloud addressed the issues of:  (1) whether a 2009 herd management area plan 
(“HMAP”) established a horse level population that could ensure genetic viability; (2) whether 
the USFS’s decision to repair, maintain, and slightly extend a fence violated the Wild Horses act; 
and (3) whether the Government ignored NEPA obligations regarding their use of a categorical 
exclusion in disposing wild horses it removes from the Pryor Mountain Wild Horse Range.7 
III.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 The Secretary of the Interior established the Pryor Mountain Wild Horse Range in 1968.8  
The range spans 39,650 acres in Carbon County, Montana, and Big Horn County, Wyoming.9  
Three years after establishment, Congress passed the Wild Horses Act, which assigned the BLM 
and the USFS duties to care for, and manage wild horses.10   
 In 1984, the Government issued an HMAP that established an appropriate management 
level (“AML”) of 121 wild horses plus or minus five percent.11  In 1992, the 1984 HMAP was 
modified as the AML was adjusted to 95 wild horses plus or minus 10 percent, or 85 to 105 wild 
horses.12  The 1992 HMAP governed wild horse management in the Pryor Mountain Wild Horse 
Range until 2009.13 
 In 2009, the HMAP was modified due to the results of a range evaluation conducted by 
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the BLM, USFS, and National Park Service.14  The evaluation found that portions of the range 
were overused because of grazing and drought.15  Ultimately, the 2009 HMAP established an 
AML of 90-120 horses and provided for the repair, maintenance, and slight extension of the 
northern boundary fence.16  Cloud appealed the BLM’s 2009 HMAP to the Interior Board of 
Land Appeals (“IBLA”) and the USFS.17   
 Following the appeal, Cloud filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
challenging a planned gather of wild horses on the range.18  Additionally, Cloud moved for a 
temporary restraining order to enjoin the gather.19  The court denied the motion and the planned 
gather concluded.20  Almost one year later, Cloud filed a Second Amended Complaint on which 
the Government moved for partial judgment.21  The Government also requested to transfer the 
case to the U.S. District Court of Montana.22  Both motions were denied.23  Finally, Cloud filed a 
motion for summary judgment, and the Government filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment.24 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Before analyzing either party’s claims, the court determined the actions taken by the 
Government under the Wild Horses Act and NEPA would be reviewed under the APA.25  Under 
the APA, a court can only set aside agency action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
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discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”26  Review under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard is narrow, and courts must be “extremely deferential” to agency decisions and 
predictions within their area of expertise.27   
 As to the Government’s two claims, the court first agreed that Cloud did not challenge 
any final agency action but then disagreed with the Government’s argument that Cloud failed to 
exhaust their administrative remedies.28  The court found Cloud did not challenge a final agency 
action because they asserted their claims against the 2009 HMAP decision instead of the IBLA 
decision,29 and Department of the Interior regulations make clear that IBLA decisions are final 
agency actions.30  Although Cloud did not challenge the appropriate decision, the court 
disallowed them to file leave to amend their complaint because even if they had challenged the 
IBLA decision, they still would not have survived summary judgment.31  Second, the court found 
Cloud had sufficiently exhausted their administrative remedies because, during the IBLA and 
USFS administrative appeal process, Cloud was consistent and alleged that the 2009 HMAP 
violated the Wild Horses Act by incorrectly failing to consider range expansion outside the 
boundary of the range.32 
 Regarding Cloud’s three claims, the court held that:  (1) the Government used reasoned 
decision making when determining target horse and burro populations in the HMAP; (2) the 
fence repair and extension was not an arbitrary and capricious action; and (3) the use of a 
categorical exclusion in the 2009 HMAP was moot and challenges to future categorical 
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exclusions are not final agency action.33  
 The court noted BLM officials have significant discretion to choose wild horse and burro 
populations.34  In setting the target population at 90-120, the BLM considered competing claims 
for the land and agreed to preserve genetic traits and bloodlines, and to ensure maximum genetic 
variation while maintaining healthy rangelands.35  As such, the court found the BLM used 
reasoned decision-making, and its actions in setting the population objective at 90-120 animals 
were not arbitrary and capricious.36 
 Second, the court found that the USFS thoroughly explained its decision to repair, 
maintain, and slightly extend the Northern Boundary Fence.37  The USFS explained the 
alterations to the fence would:  reduce or halt the need for moving or handling horses; reduce 
long-term maintenance needs; minimize conflicts with other uses on adjacent National Forest 
System Land; and would not affect the free roaming ability of the herd within the territory.38 
 Finally, the court found that the Government’s use of a categorical exclusion in the 2009 
HMAP did not violate NEPA.  A categorical exclusion is used when a government agency 
decides certain conduct does “not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the 
human environment.”39  Because the categorical exclusion in the 2009 gather disposition was 
complete, Cloud’s claim was moot.40  Also, a challenge to future categorical exclusions was 
inappropriate because it would not challenge final agency action.41  Future categorical exclusions 
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will be shaped by numerous factors and circumstances unique to a particular horse gather.42  
Accordingly, a court cannot determine whether an agency violated NEPA when it relies on a 
categorical exclusion when making a decision until the court has the ability to review the BLM’s 
reasoning.43 
CONCLUSION 
 In Cloud Foundation, the District Court for the District of Columbia made clear that, in 
the absence of a private right of action, agency action will be afforded an high degree of 
deference.  So long as the agency can articulate a basic explanation for its action, courts will not 
take issue with agency decisions and predictions.   
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